Congress’s woes didn’t end in 1967, in fact, this defeat was just the beginning of a series of political missteps that would eventually lead to its near-exile from UP
By Amit Pandey
In the world of Indian politics, few states are as pivotal as Uttar Pradesh (UP). With its massive population and diverse electorate, it has been the battleground for many of the country’s most significant political shifts. At the heart of this drama lies Congress—once the undisputed king of Indian politics, but now struggling to regain its lost ground in the state. Congress’s failure to capture UP again after its loss in 1967 has been a key reason for its long-term decline in the country. Despite its decades-long dominance at the national level, the party’s inability to adapt to the changing political realities in UP has left it languishing in the shadows. So, what went wrong? And more importantly, what lessons can be learned from Congress’s political journey in UP?
The 1967 Blunder:
The seeds of Congress’s downfall in UP were sown in 1967. Before this, the party had been in power in the state for over three decades, with little competition to challenge its authority. However, the 1967 election marked a critical turning point. Congress, despite its dominance at the national level, was unseated in the state, giving rise to a coalition government led by Charan Singh. This marked the first time in 35 years that Congress lost power in UP. But how did this happen? The answer lies in a series of internal issues within the party and its failure to address the emerging opposition wave.
One of the key figures involved during this time was Sucheta Kripalani, India’s first woman chief minister of a state. A well-respected freedom fighter, Kripalani seemed like the perfect choice to lead the state. However, her tenure quickly turned into a disaster. As Shyamlal Yadav highlights in his book At the Power: The Heart of Power, Chief Ministers of Uttar Pradesh, Kripalani’s leadership was undermined by constant internal struggles within Congress. She was beset by factionalism, and her inability to manage these internal dynamics further weakened her position. There were also accusations of corruption and caste-based politics during her tenure, which further alienated large sections of the electorate.
This was a time of significant political upheaval, both at the state and national levels. The rise of leaders like Ram Manohar Lohia and J.B. Kripalani (her own husband) in national politics had a direct impact on her political stability in Uttar Pradesh. Lohia, with his socialist ideals, was particularly critical of Congress’s policies, and his influence among the masses grew rapidly. His growing prominence was matched by the increasing disillusionment of the public with Congress’s authoritarian tendencies, which only worsened Kripalani’s position.
In the midst of this political chaos, Congress failed to recognize the growing opposition wave in UP. The party’s inability to adapt to the changing political landscape was one of the key reasons for its defeat. By the time the 1967 election results came in, Congress had lost its grip on power, and UP was no longer under its control. The formation of Charan Singh’s coalition government marked the beginning of Congress’s slow decline in the state. However, this defeat was not an isolated event—it was the first sign of a broader shift in Indian politics, one that Congress failed to fully understand.
From Emergency to Mandal
Congress’s woes didn’t end in 1967. In fact, this defeat was just the beginning of a series of political missteps that would eventually lead to its near-exile from UP. The party’s failure to recognize the changing political currents in the state continued through the 1970s and 1980s, culminating in one of the most controversial periods in India’s history—the Emergency.
In 1975, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi imposed Emergency across the country, which led to widespread political repression. The decision to suspend civil liberties, arrest political opponents, and suppress the press caused massive outrage, particularly in Uttar Pradesh. During this period, Congress’s authoritarian tendencies were laid bare, and many voters began to view the party with increasing disdain. In UP, this period of repression saw Congress lose significant ground, not just among intellectuals and urban elites, but also among the masses.
The imposition of Emergency led to a backlash in the form of the 1977 elections. The Janata Party, a coalition of anti-Congress forces, swept to power, and Congress suffered a major defeat. This was the first time that Congress lost the national elections since India’s independence. The 1977 election result was particularly damaging in UP, where Congress had already seen its power erode. The state was now firmly under the control of the Janata Party, and Congress was increasingly relegated to the political margins.
The post-Emergency period also saw the rise of new political forces in UP. In 1977, Ram Naresh Yadav became the state’s first OBC (Other Backward Class) Chief Minister, signaling the growing importance of caste-based politics in UP. This was a game-changer for the state, as it marked the beginning of a shift in the political landscape. Congress, however, continued to ignore these shifts. The party failed to recognize the importance of OBCs in the state’s politics, and this miscalculation ultimately led to its downfall.
The 1980s and 1990s witnessed the rise of two new political forces in UP—Mulayam Singh Yadav’s Samajwadi Party (SP) and Mayawati’s Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP). Both of these parties successfully tapped into the state’s complex caste dynamics, and by the time the 1990s arrived, Congress had become an afterthought in UP politics. Mulayam Singh Yadav’s Samajwadi Party emerged as a powerful force among the Yadavs and other OBCs, while Mayawati’s BSP found solid support among Dalits. Congress, on the other hand, failed to form any meaningful alliances with these groups and continued to alienate them with its outdated policies.
The Congress party, once the dominant political force in India, has seen a significant decline in its influence over the past two decades. A critical reason behind this decline is the party’s failure to retain and nurture its core support base: the families of freedom fighters and the grassroots cadre that loyally supported it during its heyday. This disconnect, particularly evident since the mid-1990s, has resulted in the erosion of the party’s organizational strength and electoral performance, especially in pivotal states like Uttar Pradesh.
The Exodus of Core Supporters
The Congress of pre-1995 enjoyed robust support from freedom fighter families and dedicated workers who viewed the party as a torchbearer of India’s independence and democracy. However, post-1995, a lack of engagement and recognition led to these groups feeling alienated. This exodus became pronounced in Uttar Pradesh, India’s largest and politically most significant state. According to electoral data, Congress’s vote share in Uttar Pradesh plummeted from 27% in 1991 to a meager 6.25% in 2022, reflecting its inability to connect with traditional supporters.
The issue was compounded by the party’s failure to tap into its reserve of retired government officials and bureaucrats who had been staunch Congress supporters. In states like Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, and even Delhi, many retired professionals were once the backbone of the party’s organizational machinery. However, their loyalty was taken for granted, and no efforts were made to involve them meaningfully in decision-making or campaigns.
The Congress’s approach to leadership in Uttar Pradesh has been another critical misstep. Instead of broadening its leadership pool and empowering new voices, the party remained confined to a handful of leaders such as Salman Khurshid, Pramod Tiwari, and Rita Bahuguna Joshi. While these leaders were prominent figures, their influence was limited to a few districts, leaving the vast majority of the state without effective representation.
This narrow focus alienated potential leaders and cadres from other regions, leading to a fragmented and disillusioned organizational structure. For instance, the Congress failed to nurture leaders who could rival regional heavyweights like Mulayam Singh Yadav in Uttar Pradesh or Nitish Kumar in Bihar. As a result, it lost significant ground to parties like the Samajwadi Party (SP), Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).
The neglect of grassroots workers has weakened the Congress’s ability to mobilize support during elections. Unlike the BJP, which has built a vast and disciplined cadre through its affiliate organizations like the RSS, the Congress has no comparable mechanism. The workers who once mobilized voters and sustained the party at the grassroots level have either switched allegiance or retired, leaving a void that the party has failed to fill.
In 2019, for example, the BJP secured a staggering 49.6% vote share in Uttar Pradesh compared to the Congress’s 6.3%, showcasing the organizational disparity. While the BJP used its cadre to connect with voters on issues like nationalism and welfare schemes, the Congress struggled to even field candidates in all constituencies.
For the Congress to regain its lost ground, especially in critical states like Uttar Pradesh, it must address the root causes of its decline. This involves reconnecting with its core supporters, empowering grassroots workers, and broadening its leadership beyond a few districts. A systematic approach to rebuilding the party’s organizational structure, similar to its post-1977 revival under Indira Gandhi, is essential.
Failing to address these issues will only push the Congress further into irrelevance, leaving the political landscape increasingly polarized and dominated by regional and right-wing parties.
BJP’s Big Win
While Congress struggled in UP, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was busy making inroads. The BJP, which had emerged from the ashes of the Janata Party, capitalized on the rise of Hindu identity politics in the state. The 1990s marked the beginning of the BJP’s rise in UP, with the party capitalizing on the Ram Janmabhoomi movement. The movement, which sought to build a Ram temple in Ayodhya, resonated with large sections of the Hindu population in UP and beyond.
The BJP’s strong position in UP was solidified with the rise of Kalyan Singh, the first BJP Chief Minister of the state. Under his leadership, the BJP capitalized on the growing popularity of Hindutva, and the party began to emerge as the dominant force in the state. Kalyan Singh’s tenure was marked by the Babri Masjid demolition in 1992, an event that had a lasting impact on UP’s political landscape. The incident further galvanized Hindu sentiment in the state and provided the BJP with a solid political base.
However, it was under the leadership of Yogi Adityanath that the BJP truly solidified its dominance in UP. Adityanath, who became Chief Minister in 2017, has embraced a hardline Hindutva agenda and has taken bold decisions to reinforce the BJP’s hold on the state. His controversial decisions, such as renaming cities like Allahabad to Prayagraj and Faizabad to Ayodhya, reflect his commitment to pushing the Hindu agenda. Under his leadership, the BJP not only won the 2017 state elections but also delivered another resounding victory in 2022, making it clear that the party had cemented its place in UP for the foreseeable future.
Congress’s Missed Lessons:
Congress’s failure to regain power in UP is a textbook example of political stagnation. After its defeat in 1967, Congress failed to adapt to the rapidly changing political landscape of the state. The rise of caste-based politics, the growing influence of regional parties, and the appeal of Hindu identity politics were all trends that Congress failed to grasp. While the party continued to rely on its traditional base—particularly the upper-caste vote—it failed to connect with the emerging power centers of OBCs, Dalits, and Muslims.
Moreover, Congress’s internal strife, particularly during the reign of Indira Gandhi and the rise of her son, Sanjay Gandhi, further alienated large sections of the electorate. The party’s failure to project a clear leadership and vision for UP allowed regional parties to fill the void.
The rise of the BJP in UP also highlighted Congress’s failure to adapt. While the BJP capitalized on the growing appeal of Hindu identity politics, Congress failed to come up with a counter-narrative that resonated with the people of the state. The party’s inability to connect with the electorate, particularly the youth, is one of the key reasons for its continued marginalization.
What’s Next for Congress in UP?
The political history of UP is a sobering lesson for Congress. The party’s inability to adapt to changing times, coupled with its internal divisions, has resulted in its long-term decline in the state. While the rise of the BJP and regional parties like SP and BSP has reshaped the political landscape, Congress still has a chance to recover—if it learns from its past mistakes.
The key for Congress lies in understanding the changing political realities of UP and embracing new strategies that address the concerns of the electorate. Whether it’s forming alliances with regional parties, addressing caste dynamics, or engaging with the youth, Congress must find a way to make itself relevant again in the state. UP remains the most important political battleground in India, and if Congress hopes to regain its place at the national table, it must first win the war for Uttar Pradesh.
