In March 2023, the AUKUS nations revealed a detailed roadmap for delivering SSNs to Australia, marking a critical moment in the development of Australia’s undersea defense capabilities
Amit Pandey
On August 12, 2024, the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia signed an agreement that cements the transfer of Naval Nuclear Propulsion (NNP) technology to Australia as part of the AUKUS trilateral security pact. This agreement represents a significant leap in Australia’s efforts to acquire conventionally armed nuclear attack submarines (SSN), marking a turning point in the nation’s defense capabilities. The pact lays out the legal and technical framework for the transfer of submarine reactors, materials, and equipment necessary for the construction and operation of these advanced vessels. Having been tabled in the Australian Parliament, the agreement awaits formal approval before it takes effect, signaling a new era of military cooperation between these Western allies, driven by the shared strategic imperative of countering growing threats in the Indo-Pacific region.
The AUKUS pact, first unveiled on September 15, 2021, gained immediate global attention due to its far-reaching implications. The last time the United States shared such highly sensitive military technology was in 1958 with the United Kingdom under the Mutual Defence Agreement, underscoring the rarity and significance of the current collaboration. One of the central features of the partnership involves the transfer of High Enriched Uranium (HEU) to Australia, which, as a non-nuclear-weapon state, raised concerns about potential violations of global non-proliferation regimes. Critics questioned whether providing Australia with HEU for its submarines might undermine the existing nuclear non-proliferation framework. However, the August 2024 agreement clarifies these concerns by establishing a policy framework that ensures the transfer of HEU adheres to international non-proliferation standards, such as those outlined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
In March 2023, the AUKUS nations revealed a detailed roadmap for delivering SSNs to Australia, marking a critical moment in the development of Australia’s undersea defense capabilities. The roadmap consists of multiple phases, the first of which focuses on building the industrial infrastructure and training personnel necessary for submarine construction. Australian Navy personnel have already begun training aboard US and UK submarines, underscoring the importance of skill development in ensuring operational readiness. This process took a significant step forward in August 2024 when the Submarine Tendered Maintenance Period (STMP) began at HMAS Stirling in Western Australia. This phase allows Australian personnel to directly participate in the maintenance of nuclear-powered submarines, preparing them for future operational roles.
By 2027, the United States and the United Kingdom will deploy a rotational force of their submarines in Australian waters, a move designed to bolster deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. This Submarine Rotational Force-West (SRF-West) will consist of up to four US Virginia-class and one UK Astute-class submarines, reinforcing the region’s strategic stability. As Australia works toward building its own submarine capabilities, the roadmap also includes the delivery of three Virginia-class submarines to Australia by the early 2030s. Two of these submarines will come from the US Navy’s existing fleet, while one will be delivered fresh off the production line. This arrangement provides an interim solution to Australia’s declining undersea capabilities, which were further strained by the cancellation of a multi-billion-dollar deal with France for conventional submarines.
Australia’s aging fleet, currently composed of six Collins-class submarines, will be gradually replaced by the new SSNs, with the final phase of the roadmap culminating in the development of a unique class of submarines, SSN-AUKUS. This new class will combine British design elements with advanced American technology, creating state-of-the-art submarines tailored to Australia’s defense needs. The first of these submarines will be built in the UK, with subsequent vessels constructed domestically in Australia, further enhancing the country’s defense industrial base.
The new NNP agreement builds upon the foundational work of the 2021 Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information Agreement (ENNPIA), which provided the policy framework for the exchange of sensitive information between the three nations. While ENNPIA was limited to information sharing, the 2024 agreement goes further, establishing the legal basis for the physical transfer of submarine reactors and related materials to Australia. The reactors, which contain sealed, welded HEU, are designed to power Australia’s submarines throughout their entire operational lifespan without the need for refueling. This approach ensures that the amount of HEU delivered to Australia will be tightly controlled, adhering to non-proliferation commitments.
As a non-nuclear-weapon state, Australia has repeatedly emphasized that its acquisition of NNP technology does not violate international non-proliferation agreements. Under Article 14 of its Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement (CSA) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Australia argues that the use of nuclear material for non-proscribed military activities, such as naval propulsion, is not a breach of safeguards. While the CSA does not explicitly mention nuclear propulsion, Australia is working with the IAEA to update Article 14, ensuring it explicitly covers NNP technology as a non-proscribed activity. Moreover, Australia has pledged not to enrich uranium or reprocess spent nuclear fuel, further assuaging concerns about potential proliferation risks. The agreement also includes safeguards requiring the US and UK to terminate the transfer of nuclear materials should Australia violate the NPT or any of its international obligations.
Given the sensitive nature of the technology involved, the agreement contains extensive security provisions to protect against theft, espionage, or sabotage. Stringent protocols are in place to safeguard classified information, and even the IAEA will not have access to sensitive details regarding the propulsion systems. These measures underscore the importance of maintaining the confidentiality of the technology being transferred, especially given its military significance.
While AUKUS has strong support from Australia’s two major political parties, it has faced criticism from certain factions of the political spectrum. The Australian Greens, for example, have raised concerns over clauses that allow the United States and the United Kingdom to terminate the agreement with just one year’s notice without compensating Australia. There are also concerns about indemnity clauses that make Australia financially responsible for any accidents that occur during the construction or maintenance of the submarines. Additionally, critics have questioned the costs associated with HEU transfers, pointing out that Australia has limited leverage over pricing.
Former Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating and former Senator Rex Patrick have also voiced concerns, arguing that Australia’s strategic autonomy is being compromised by aligning too closely with US and UK interests. Furthermore, there are practical concerns about the United States’ ability to deliver Virginia-class submarines on time, given the current industrial base challenges highlighted in recent Congressional reports. These reports suggest that the US submarine manufacturing industry is facing significant shortfalls in meeting its own navy’s demands, raising questions about whether the agreed-upon timelines for AUKUS deliveries are realistic.
Despite these concerns, the AUKUS pact remains a cornerstone of Australia’s defense strategy in the Indo-Pacific. The partnership between Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom reflects a deepening of strategic ties that have endured since the Cold War. Australia’s alignment with US security interests has been a consistent feature of its foreign policy, and this is unlikely to change in the face of rising geopolitical tensions in the region. AUKUS not only strengthens Australia’s naval capabilities but also sets a precedent for other non-nuclear-weapon states seeking to acquire NNP technology without violating global non-proliferation norms. As the trilateral partnership continues to evolve, it will play a crucial role in shaping the security landscape of the Indo-Pacific for decades to come.
