The judgement and moderation with which democratic institutions employ their powers, rather than the authority they possess, is what gives them legitimacy. This requirement is especially stringent for the court since it represents the people's last hope for justice against injustice and power. The issue is no longer one of individual behaviour alone when the lines between authority and haughtiness, discipline and humiliation, disagreement and defiance, start to blur in a courtroom. The institution's own credibility is put to the test.

This issue is brought to light by the controversy surrounding Justice Ajay Bhanot's Allahabad High Court courtroom in October 2026. The Bar Association claims that a lawyer who objected to a Superintendent of Police using a room designated for advocates was ordered to apologise and threatened with incarceration. On October 28, following protests, rumours surfaced that several advocates had disrupted the courtroom by hurling chairs and destroying furniture. According to reports, instructions were then given to use CCTV footage to identify the advocates in question and take proper measures.

An unbiased investigation and due process of law must be used to ascertain the truth of these accusations and the issue of accountability. Just as the freedom to protest cannot excuse an attack on the dignity of the courtroom, judicial position does not elevate anyone above the requirements of institutional propriety. The most concerning question is this: why did an organisation tasked with maintaining the supremacy of justice come to the point where discussion and legitimate disagreement were replaced by conflict and power struggles?

Judicial Dignity Has Its Limits

The administration of justice depends on respect for judges and courts. However, respect must never turn into a shield from responsibility. The power to enforce the law is granted by judicial office, but it does not give permission for irrational behaviour, degrading language, or personal outbursts. Within the parameters of professional discipline, solicitors must voice their disagreements. Judges must also wield institutional authority responsibly and refrain from seeing dissent as a personal slight.

Judicial firmness and personal harshness are fundamentally different. Humiliating someone is not an acceptable use of judicial power; rejecting an unsustainable argument is. While upholding courtroom order is crucial, it's just as vital to stop the misuse of dignity in its name. A judge's duty to exercise self-control and accountability increases with their level of authority.

A court observation can have significant social ramifications even if it is not included in a final decision. Therefore, fairness, decency, and constitutional sensitivity must guide judicial discourse.

When Judicial Language Crosses the Line

Chief Justice of India Surya Kant reportedly made a comment in May 2026 that was criticised for allegedly comparing jobless law grads to "cockroaches." He later emphasised that his criticism was limited to people who entered the legal profession on the basis of phoney or dubious degrees and that his statement had been taken out of context. It is necessary to properly acknowledge this explanation.

However, the principle is still clear: a frivolous petition calls for legitimate dismissal—not a demeaning parallel; professional misbehaviour calls for action under the relevant standards; and suspicions about eligibility ask for verification. The question of someone's claimed misbehaviour and their intrinsic human dignity are completely different.

Judicial language must be evaluated not just in terms of its legal ramifications but also in terms of how it affects people' dignity and public trust in the judiciary's objectivity. Judicial power includes strong criticism, yet moderation in speech is also crucial.

The ability to maintain dignity even in the face of the most intense disagreement is the ultimate manifestation of judicial power, not the harshness of its rulings.

From a Disputed Chair to a Crisis of Trust

A disagreement over a chair at the Allahabad High Court has grown into a more significant issue involving authority, respect, and judicial propriety. According to the Bar Association, a lawyer who voiced an objection was ordered to apologise to a police officer and threatened with imprisonment. If proven true, these accusations should be examined in light of the rationale, proportionality, and due process that control the use of judicial power. On the other hand, claims of chaos in the courtroom also need to be looked into objectively.

The constrained use of power, rather than being impervious to criticism, is what gives judicial office its dignity. Lawful behaviour is also essential to the dignity of solicitors. Disagreement should encourage institutional procedure rather than a power struggle. The issue goes beyond individual behaviour when the judges and legal community opt for conflict over communication; it becomes a test of institutional self-correction and public trust in the legal system.

Lawyers’ Conduct

Lawyers play a crucial role in the administration of justice. They have the right to file institutional complaints and contest incorrect judicial behaviour, but this right is nevertheless subject to professional discipline and the decency of court proceedings. Regardless of the provocation, damaging court property, hurling chairs, or blocking sessions are never acceptable forms of protest.

The seriousness of the situation is highlighted by the reported directive to use CCTV footage to identify people involved in the Allahabad High Court event and to investigate potential contempt and disciplinary actions. Evidence and due process must also be used to determine the accountability of the involved lawyers.

Two separate considerations are whether the judge should be held accountable for the lawyers' disruptive behaviour and whether the judge should be investigated for potential wrongdoing. The misbehaviour of one party does not excuse the other. Only when dissent stays within the confines of law and discipline does the justification of judicial propriety have any weight.

When Authority Clashes, Justice Suffers

Two essential cornerstones of the legal system are the Bar and the Bench. The administration of justice is their ultimate goal, notwithstanding the differences in their duties. A lawyer must successfully defend the client's rights, and a judge must make decisions in an unbiased manner. In this process, disagreement is inevitable. However, the integrity of judicial institutions is damaged when professional disagreements turn into conflicts over personal reputation.

Just as professional independence does not give lawyers the right to interfere with court processes, judicial independence does not absolve judges of accountability. Respect for one another, communication, and legal disagreement are essential for good bar-bench interactions. This institutional balance is threatened by courtroom chaos, boycotts, and humiliation.

Instead of using conflicting accusations and counter-allegations, such issues must be settled by unbiased institutional means. Professional misconduct by solicitors must prompt action in compliance with the regulations, and complaints against a judge's behaviour must be evaluated in light of the evidence and established norms. Transparency, impartiality, and due process are essential in both situations.

Just as taking part in a protest does not instantly prove guilt, holding an institutional role does not automatically grant protection from examination.

Only when authority is accompanied by accountability and dissent is accompanied by discipline can the dignity of justice be maintained. Whether the Bar and the Bench continue to be answerable to the law they are sworn to uphold is the ultimate test, not who wins a dispute between them.

Justice Katju’s Remark

Shakespeare's Hamlet, "Something is rotten in the State of Denmark", was cited by a Supreme Court bench made up of Justices Markandey Katju and Gyan Sudha Misra on November 26, 2010, in Raja Khan v. U.P. Sunni Central Waqf Board. The bench made grave observations regarding the Allahabad High Court's operations. Since those comments were made under the particular circumstances of that case, they cannot be seen as proof of the current dispute or as evidence of a direct relationship between the two.

However, their institutional message is still applicable. Judicial prestige is a duty to maintain impartiality and responsibility, not a license to avoid examination. A judicial institution's dignity is safeguarded by unbiased investigation, due process, and required reform rather than by hiding its flaws. Justice is not served by an emotive defence or an unsupported denunciation. Institutions must also be subject to the standards of justice, fairness, and accountability in order to uphold the rule of law.

When the Bench Must Answer

Although they have different institutional roles, judges and solicitors are both subject to the law and the ethical norms of their profession. In compliance with the law, a judge exercises contempt powers, oversees procedures, and exerts judicial authority. Therefore, accountability must be evaluated in relation to the position held, the authority used, and the outcomes.

Due process, impartiality, and moderation are required while using judicial power. Strict instructions shouldn't be used as a means of enhancing one's own status; rather, they should support judicial discipline. Lawyers must also make sure that their opposition is respectable and legal; interfering with court processes is not a valid form of protest.

The need for self-control and accountability increases with authority. A lawyer's dignity is found in daring resistance within the confines of the law, while a judge's dignity is found in unbiased justice.

Accountability Is the Soul of Justice

Serious reflection on judicial behaviour, the appropriateness of spoken statements, grievance-redressal procedures, and the disciplinary function of bar associations is required in light of the Allahabad High Court incident. Although judicial independence is necessary for constitutionally sound decision-making, it does not imply immunity from accountability. Similarly, the legal profession's independence does not grant it the authority to subvert judicial discipline.

Instead of a battle between opposing factions, what is required is an unbiased institutional framework where complaints are heard, accusations are fairly examined, and proven misbehaviour prompts legal action. Just as no profession can claim immunity from discipline, no office can be exempt from accountability.

Protecting judicial independence and public confidence requires openness, impartiality, and institutional self-examination.

When Justice Itself Faces the Test

An unbiased probe is required in light of the Allahabad High Court incident. Due process must be followed when hearing the Bar Association's accusations and the judge's stance. Allegations of vandalism and interfering with judicial processes must also be supported by evidence. Just as judicial office is not an immunity from accountability, an accusation is not a conviction.

However, the common man who goes to court in search of justice is at the centre of this dispute. For that citizen, a courtroom is neither a venue for the authority of a lawyer nor a platform for the prestige of a judge. It is a constitutional haven where justice is pursued and rights are upheld. Public trust is inevitably damaged when the very defenders of justice seem to be involved in a conflict over power and appropriateness.

The judiciary is subject to public criticism and is not an untouchable sanctuary. Although judicial independence is essential, it cannot shield judges from accountability. The rule of law depends on unbiased investigation of complaints, professional discipline among lawyers, and judicial restraint.

People now ask questions instead of just watching. The ability of public consciousness to force even the most powerful centers of power to reflect is demonstrated by history. However, the goal of judicial reform is to increase an institution's accountability to its own constitutional duties rather than to weaken it.

The warning is clear: the authority of justice is based on the impartiality and integrity of behaviour rather than the position of authority. In the end, the question is whether the constitutional dignity of justice itself survived this conflict rather than whose personal dignity was violated. An unbiased investigation, legal action, and institutional reflection will yield the answer rather than conflicting accusations.

(The author, a Doctorate in Laws, is a senior lawyer and civil society activist.)