A Quota Decided in Delhi, Questions Raised in Kashmir

  • Reservation, Representation and the Unresolved Question of Social Justice in Jammu and Kashmir

 

Every society tells its young people what effort is worth. In much of Jammu and Kashmir today, that story is being rewritten by decisions the young themselves had no part in making. A graduate in Anantnag or Baramulla may spend years preparing for one recruitment cycle, only to find the outcome shaped long before the paper was printed: not by an examiner, but by a quota matrix amended while the Union Territory was governed directly from New Delhi. This is not an argument against social justice. India’s Constitution rightly promises protection to communities that history has left behind, and Kashmir has tribal and backward populations of its own who need it. It is an argument about process, proportion and power: how this framework came into being, whether its arithmetic can be defended, who benefits where, and why an elected government that wants to correct it cannot do so on its own. Those questions explain why a policy meant to widen opportunity has become so bitterly contested.

 

Decisions Taken Without the People

The present structure was assembled in stages after 2019. Reorganisation into a Union Territory brought national provisions, including the ten per cent quota for Economically Weaker Sections (EWS), into force in Jammu and Kashmir. The decisive change came in 2024, when Parliament amended the Scheduled Tribes list to include the Pahari Ethnic Group, Paddari Tribe, Koli and Gadda Brahmin communities. Rules notified in March 2024 under the Lieutenant Governor then created a separate ten per cent ST-II allocation for these communities, in addition to the ten per cent for the existing Scheduled Tribes. The Union Territory then had no elected government or functioning Assembly. The resulting structure, as reported, is set out below.

 

CategoryShareWho it covers
Scheduled Castes (SC)8%Scheduled Caste communities
Scheduled Tribes, group 110%Tribes already listed, including Gujjars and Bakarwals
Scheduled Tribes, group 210%Pahari Ethnic Group, Paddari Tribe, Koli and Gadda Brahmin communities
Other Backward Classes8%Socially backward castes
Residents of Backward Areas10%Residents of notified backward areas
Line of Control / Border areas4%Residents of areas near the LoC and International Border
Subtotal, non-EWS vertical categories50% 
Economically Weaker Sections10%Households below the income and asset thresholds
Total vertical reservation60% 

Figures as reported in Kashmir Life and Careers360 coverage and the 2024 rules.

 

Three different numbers are in circulation, and the debate is muddied when they are confused. The first is the statutory framework. The government’s position, stated in replies to the Assembly, is that vertical reservation excluding EWS stands at fifty per cent, in line with Supreme Court judgments, and that the ten per cent EWS provision is separate. Horizontal reservations, such as those for ex-servicemen and persons with disabilities, operate across these categories and are not added to the vertical total. The second number is the arithmetic that students and critics apply: fifty per cent plus ten per cent EWS makes sixty, which would leave forty. The third is what recruitment actually delivers. Press reports put the effective open-merit share in direct recruitment nearer thirty per cent, and the pending proposals are described as raising it to forty. Reconciling them is the government’s task, which is why a published, category-wise breakdown matters. None of this settles whether the outcome is fair, and that question begins with legitimacy. A democracy can legitimately choose to expand affirmative action. What it cannot do without losing credibility is rearrange the life chances of an entire generation through a process in which that generation’s own legislature had no voice. Legitimacy is the difference between a policy people may disagree with and one they feel was done to them.

 

The Ceiling, the Statute and the Evidence

Process is only the first test. The second is whether the design can be justified in law and evidence, and two legal sources must be kept apart. The first is judicial. The fifty per cent principle comes from the Supreme Court’s reservation jurisprudence, beginning with IndraSawhney, which treated it as a limit that could be crossed only in extraordinary circumstances and on demonstrated grounds. The Court’s 2022 judgment upholding the EWS quota called the ceiling a rule of prudence rather than an inviolable bar, and gave EWS reservation its own constitutional footing. The second source is statutory: the Jammu and Kashmir Reservation Act, 2004, the 2005 rules and the March 2024 notification set out what the Union Territory may and may not do, and their wording is a different question from the judicial principle. To call sixty per cent automatically unconstitutional merges the two and would not survive scrutiny. The case is narrower, and harder to rebut. The government has told the Assembly that the non-EWS categories sit at fifty per cent, and in another reply that the cap may be exceeded in exceptional circumstances. Either way, one principle applies: an exception must be proven, not assumed. Proof means evidence, namely a current, public, community-by-community assessment of backwardness and of representation in the services. As far as is publicly known, no fresh exercise of that kind accompanied the 2024 changes, and analysts note that the framework is debated without an updated data base. A ceiling cannot be lifted, or an allocation fixed, on the strength of a presumption, least of all when the cost is carried by the young.

 

A Map That Does Not Match the Population

Evidence matters for a second reason: it shows where the benefits actually fall. Kashmir holds roughly 55 per cent of the Union Territory’s population and Jammu about 45, according to the 2011 census. Government data shared with the Assembly for the reported period showed that 85.3 per cent of Scheduled Tribe certificates were issued in Jammu division, compared with 14.7 per cent in Kashmir division. Caution is needed in reading this. Certificates are not recruitment benefits, and neither is the same as the number of eligible people. Tribal and caste populations are not spread evenly across any state, a lopsided distribution does not by itself prove bias, and population share alone does not determine entitlement; what counts is each community’s documented backwardness and representation in the services. Even so, the figures expose a design question. A single, uniform matrix was applied to two divisions with very different social compositions, and the more populous division holds the smaller share of reserved-category certificates, so more of its young people compete for the open pool. Only fresh data can show whether the ST-II allocation matches the combined population of its four communities. A matrix this consequential should be calibrated to the demographic map, not laid over it.

 

The Voice in the Assembly: SajadGani Lone

These disparities have found their most persistent advocate in SajadGani Lone, People’s Conference president and MLA from Handwara. In the March 2025 budget session he told the Assembly that the policy was being used to exclude the Kashmiri-speaking population from the power structure, and he warned that in twenty years few Kashmiri speakers would be seen in the Secretariat. Outside the House he has called the government’s own figures a shocker and the system rigged against Kashmiri speakers. After the September 2026 selections to the Jammu and Kashmir Administrative Service and Accounts (Gazetted) cadres, in which reporting indicates only 10 of the 55 officers chosen were from the Valley, he called the outcome “recruitment apartheid.” By his count, the Valley received 18 per cent of the posts against a population share of about 56 per cent. These are Lone’s political assessments, and they should be read as such: allegations of design and intent are not findings, and a single selection round in small cadres is a narrow base for conclusions about a whole system. He says he is not against reservation but against killing merit, and he has not spared Valley officialdom, suggesting that Kashmiri officers share the blame for how certificates are issued. He frames the injury as one done to the Kashmiri-speaking people, Muslims and Hindus alike. Some in the Valley read a further dimension into the pattern, but that too is a political judgment, testable only with the evidence called for below.

 

An Elected Government Without the Power to Fix It

The ballot box was supposed to supply the answer. In 2024, voters chose a government that had promised to expand open merit, and the record since divides into what is official and what is merely reported. Officially, the Cabinet constituted a Sub-Committee under Social Welfare Minister Sakina Itoo on 10 December 2024, and it submitted its report on 10 June 2025. The government’s replies to the Assembly state that the report is under examination by the competent authority. The report itself has not been released. The rest comes from media reports citing sources. They say the Cabinet cleared the recommendations in early December 2025 and forwarded them to the Lieutenant Governor; that the Union Home Ministry then raised queries, including about the data used to justify the changes; and that the Cabinet approved its response in June 2026. As late as September 2026 the file was reported pending, with no timeline. The recommendations are reported to cut the EWS quota from ten to three per cent and the Backward Areas quota from ten to seven, lifting open merit by ten percentage points. Until the report is published none of this can be verified, and the Chief Minister’s pointing to the Lieutenant Governor’s office and the Centre as the source of delay remains a political statement. Whatever one thinks of the proposals, the sequence raises a constitutional question that goes beyond quotas. Legislative scrutiny, transparency and accountability are what make any reservation policy legitimate, because they allow those affected to examine the reasoning and challenge it. Here, an elected Cabinet studied a grievance, reached a conclusion and acted within its mandate, and its decision waits on authorities that are not answerable to the Union Territory’s own legislature. Debates about statehood, which the Assembly has urged the Centre to settle, can sound abstract; this file makes them concrete.

 

The Price of Waiting

Meanwhile, every recruitment cycle under the present matrix leaves a permanent record. Selection lists cannot be rewritten once published, and a young person who crosses the age limit while a file is under consideration has lost something no later reform can return. Students understand this better than anyone. They have protested outside the Chief Minister’s residence in Srinagar and pressed ministers to disclose what the report says. The Chief Minister promised a review in December 2024; the review was delivered, but the outcome has not been.

 

What Kashmir Is Not Asking

No serious voice in the Valley is asking to dismantle protection for Scheduled Castes, or for the Gujjar and Bakarwal communities, who are among the most marginalised people in the Union Territory, living with seasonal migration and thin access to schools and clinics. Their claim is moral and constitutional, and nothing here disputes it. Nor is the dignity of the Pahari-speaking communities, many in remote hill and border districts, in question; they are citizens with a case to be heard like any other. This is not a contest between Kashmiris and their neighbours. Anxiety among Gujjar-Bakarwal groups about a diluted share shows that the matrix is straining even the communities it was meant to serve. Justice that sets one disadvantaged group against another is badly designed, however sincere its authors. The quarrel is with a design never tested against the people it governs, not with any community standing inside it.

 

A Charter for Fairness

Criticism is cheap without a way forward, and six steps would begin to restore confidence. First, publish the evidence: release the Cabinet Sub-Committee’s report, the Home Ministry’s queries and the government’s replies now, without waiting for a final decision; a policy touching every young person should not be negotiated in a file room. Second, count before you allocate: commission a fresh, independent socio-economic and community-wise data exercise covering backwardness and representation in the services, and let its findings justify every percentage point. Third, reconcile the numbers: state plainly the statutory share, the EWS provision and the effective open-merit share in actual recruitment, and keep total vertical reservation within the fifty per cent principle unless an exception is demonstrated in public, with evidence that can be challenged. Fourth, design for geography: explore region-sensitive calibration within constitutional limits, so that quota shares reflect where communities actually live. Fifth, set a deadline: require the Centre to respond to an elected government’s reservation proposals within a fixed period, so that a file cannot wait indefinitely while a generation ages. Sixth, report every year: table category-wise and division-wise selections, and the number of seats left to open merit, before the Assembly annually.

 

A Note on the Other Side

A fair reading must include the other case, and it is not weak. The government holds that reservation serves the equitable development of deserving sections and that exceptions to the ceiling are permissible. Supporters of the 2024 changes point to a long-pending demand from Pahari-speaking and other communities, who argue that their disadvantage is comparable to that of groups already listed. Differences in certificate numbers, they add, may reflect where eligible populations live rather than unfairness. Some voices have called the proposed EWS and Backward Areas cuts divisive, since those categories help families in Jammu and Kashmir alike. And open-merit aspirants in Jammu describe the same squeeze as their Valley counterparts, which suggests a grievance that can unite the regions.

 

The Last Word Belongs to the Voters

Whichever side one favours, the test is the same. Reservation was conceived as a bridge, not a wall. It was meant to carry people from the margins into the common life of the nation, and its legitimacy rests on one condition: that those who built it and those who cross it trust it to be fair. That trust is thin in Kashmir today, and statistics alone cannot rebuild it. It requires a decision, made openly, by those who answer to the people it affects. The young of Kashmir are not asking to be exempted from competition. They are asking to compete on a field whose dimensions they were allowed to help draw. Give them that, and the quarrel over quotas can become what it should have been all along: a conversation among equals about how to leave nobody behind.

 

(Mr Rasool, a Kashmiri sociologist, is a writer, re searcher, and columnist. His research Interests In clude Kashmir Affairs, South Asian Politics, Human Rights, and Public Policy issues.)

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