When the State Closes the Square and Calls It Order, It Must Say What Danger It Feared
When a state closes the place, seals the routes and detains thousands in the name of public order, it must still answer: order for whom, and against what danger?
The Road That Was Closed
For thirty-three years, a modest stretch of road near Parliament served as the capital's designated space for dissent. Jantar Mantar was never grand. It offered no shade worth the name and no comfort to speak of. Yet its value lay precisely in its proximity: those who petitioned the republic could do so within earshot of those who governed it. On October 11, that arrangement ended with a standing order from the Delhi Police Commissioner, who denotified the site and pointed protesters towards Ramlila Maidan, Burari Ground and CBD Ground. Two days later, leaders of the Cockroach Janta Party climbed the barricades, entered the cordoned ground and were promptly detained, with a First Information Report following for unauthorised entry and obstruction. Over the preceding weekend, thousands had already been picked up and released, journalists among them.
The state calls all this public order. The protesters call it the criminalisation of assembly. The honest answer is that both accounts contain some truth, and it is precisely that overlap which obliges us to ask the harder question. If public order justifies the closure of the site, can the same rationale carry the weight of mass detentions, transport curbs and an enormous deployment of personnel? Or was the closure itself the opening move in a strategy whose real object was to deny a politically awkward demand its audience?
The Case for the State
Let us begin with the strongest version of the state's case, for it deserves a fair hearing. The Constitution does not promise an unregulated right to gather. Article 19(1)(b) protects peaceful assembly without arms, but Article 19(3) permits reasonable restrictions in the interests of public order. Police are further bound by statute to prevent cognisable offences, and the successor to the old Section 144 enables emergency orders where disturbance is apprehended. Policing a capital that houses Parliament, the Supreme Court and the President's residence is not the same as policing an ordinary town.
Three arguments sustain the police position. The first is legal continuity. The denotification followed the Supreme Court's observation that suitable alternative sites ought to be identified and designated, and three were duly named. On this reading, the authorities were heeding a judicial nudge, not inventing a pretext. The second is prevention. Officers cite earlier agitations, intelligence about mobilisation across state lines, and the possibility of marches towards sensitive institutions. Preventive action, by definition, precedes the offence; to wait for disorder is to fail at the very task one is paid to perform. The third is defiance. On October 13, protesters knowingly scaled barricades into a space whose status had been withdrawn. Whatever one thinks of the order, entering a sealed area invites consequences, and a complaint of trespass is hardly an exotic response.
A Rule Altered on Cue
On those narrow facts, the police stand on firm ground. But narrow facts are not the whole case. The October 13 breach cannot be the only event examined, because it was the consequence of an earlier act: the withdrawal of the venue itself, reportedly soon after the organisers had sought permission to use it. A rule altered at the very moment it is invoked invites the suspicion that it was altered because it was invoked.
There is also the matter of institutional candour. When authorities restrict a freedom, the burden of justification rests on them, not on the citizen who invokes it. That burden is not discharged by citing intelligence inputs that the public cannot examine and the courts have not tested. Secrecy is sometimes necessary in matters of security, but it cannot become a universal shield against accountability. If the threat was credible, a court can be shown the material in confidence; if it was merely conjectural, then the restriction rested on conjecture, and conjecture is a fragile foundation for curtailing a fundamental right.
Why Place Is Part of the Message
Consider now the other side. For a demonstrator, location is not logistics, it is language. A protest is a message, and a message needs a recipient. Jantar Mantar's closeness to the seat of power turned private grievance into public petition. Relocate the same crowd to a ground far from the corridors of authority and the form of assembly survives while its substance drains away. A shout in a distant field is merely exercise.
Allegations That Demand Inquiry
The allegations that have emerged compound this concern. Human rights monitors report beatings, people hauled into buses and vans, restrictions on movement and suspended internet services. At least thirty journalists are said to have been detained across two days, and complaints of sexual harassment of women reporters have been recorded. Organisers claim that their leaders were taken into custody on landing from a flight, that passengers were pulled off trains and buses, and that some young activists were confined to their homes. Photographs and video footage in the public domain show protesters, women among them, being dragged towards vehicles.
These remain allegations, and allegations deserve scrutiny rather than credulity. The police dispute the characterisation, and a fair inquiry may well temper some claims. But the pattern, if even partly accurate, is difficult to reconcile with a narrative of calibrated policing. Calibration implies selectivity, identify the risk, then address the risk. What the accounts describe sounds closer to saturation, in which the many are swept up for the sins, real or imagined, of the few. The protesters' defiant refrain, that resistance cannot be denotified, may be rhetoric, but it captures an uncomfortable truth: a demand does not vanish when its venue does.
The Constitutional Yardstick
The Constitution asks three questions of any restriction on assembly. Is it lawful? Is it necessary? Is it proportionate? The courts have answered these before. In the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan case, the Supreme Court declined to endorse a blanket prohibition at Jantar Mantar and insisted on a balancing mechanism, warning that alternatives must not render dissent meaningless. In Anuradha Bhasin, it held that restrictions, including sweeping prohibitory orders and curbs on communication, must answer to a real and imminent threat and remain open to review.
Proportionality on Trial
Applied here, the test yields divided verdicts. Was the denotification lawful? Possibly, given the Court's own remarks about alternatives. Was it proportionate? That depends on whether the substitutes offer genuine visibility, and distant grounds rarely do. Were the detentions lawful? Preventive detention is permitted where an offence is genuinely apprehended, but thousands of detentions, journalists included, strain the very notion of individualised suspicion. Was the force protected? Restraint is defensible when crowds turn unsafe; dragging peaceful people and obstructing reporters is not obviously that. Was the response as a whole proportionate? The Court's own caution against using a hammer to kill a fly is difficult to ignore, particularly when cancelled trains, shuttered metro stations, interrupted connectivity and a deployment of some forty thousand personnel are laid beside a single, avowedly peaceful agitation.
The state's best rejoinder is that a march from Jantar Mantar can reach Parliament within minutes, and that earlier violence justifies anticipatory caution. Both points are fair. Yet prior disorder warrants tailored prevention, not a standing presumption that every future gathering is a menace. Proportionality demands that the state demonstrate that less intrusive means, such as capped numbers, defined routes, fixed hours and identified organisers, would not have sufficed. So far, that showing has not been made.
Towards a Credible Protest Policy
What, then, would a credible policy look like? It would retain a designated site near the institutions being petitioned, with clear conditions on capacity, timing and route. It would require written, reviewable reasons whenever permission is refused or a venue changed. It would prefer targeted restrictions to city-wide shutdowns, and treat journalists and legal observers as protected, as the Court has directed. It would establish an independent, time-bound inquiry into allegations of excessive force. Internet suspensions and mass detentions would become exceptional, reviewable and rare.
Such reforms are not concessions to protesters; they are safeguards for the state itself. Authority that explains itself earns an obedience that never needs to be coerced. Every unexplained detention, every unreviewed prohibition and every muted phone line deposits a little more distrust in the public mind, and distrust, once accumulated, is far costlier to police than any rally. A government confident in the merits of its electoral and administrative choices should be the least anxious about a placard held within sight of Parliament. Legitimacy, after all, is the quiet capital on which every democratic government must ultimately draw.
Order for Whom?
A democracy may regulate where its citizens protest. It may even move them. But when it closes the place, seals the routes, mutes communication, detains thousands and calls it all public order, it owes the public an answer to a simple question, order for whom, and against what danger? If the only danger is the visibility of dissent, then the state has not preserved order. It has merely redefined dissent as disorder.
(The author, currently pursuing a Master’s degree in Journalism from Maharaja Sayajirao University of Baroda, is the founder of blogging site: dumpyourthoughts.)
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