The full political impact of the massive Congress-sponsored Opposition rally on the Modi government may take some time to sink in. But one immediate outcome is already visible: the end of the climate of fear that had gripped sections of society and liberal public opinion. Those who had gradually reconciled themselves to the inevitability of authoritarian rule can now breathe a little easier.

For quite some time, a cross-section of secular political opinion, social activists, professionals and intellectuals had come to believe that there was no end in sight to the authoritarian rule of the RSS-BJP establishment. They feared that, having mastered the art of manipulating elections and consolidating power, the BJP would be virtually impossible to dislodge.

It is somewhat puzzling that they failed to recognise the true character of the RSS-BJP ecosystem in the first place. Anyone even remotely familiar with the RSS and the ideological background of its leaders, from its founder K.B. Hedgewar to M.S. Golwalkar, should have anticipated the nature of governance that an RSS-inspired government would bring to Delhi.

Perhaps the relatively accommodating personality of Atal Bihari Vajpayee and his open-door approach created the impression that the RSS was not quite the villain its political opponents made it out to be. A product of India's composite Ganga-Jamuni tehzeeb and a poet at heart, Vajpayee remained committed to RSS ideology but was neither as intolerant nor as arrogant as Narendra Modi. He possessed what Welles Hangen aptly described as a kind of Brahminic self-assurance, which did not lead him to regard everyone who disagreed with him as an enemy. Moreover, unlike Modi, he did not appear to have a personal agenda of promoting a circle of powerful corporate friends.

When Modi claims that India made little progress during the 70 years before he came to power, he conveniently includes the six years during which his own party's founding leader headed the government. In reality, it was Vajpayee's relatively soft and diplomatic style of governance that helped create the political space in which Modi eventually rose to power without encountering serious resistance.

Modi's style of governance was alien to India's liberal and democratic political traditions, which had continued to reflect the spirit of resistance and anti-establishment politics inherited from the freedom struggle. Non-violent mass movements, irreverence towards those in high office and the freedom to question political authority have never been taboos in independent India. Over the decades, these have become integral to the country's evolving democratic culture.

The freedom struggle had witnessed numerous leaders from affluent and aristocratic backgrounds renounce their privileges and possessions to join the fight for independence. Their example, reinforced by India's cultural tradition of according greater respect to sages than to kings, taught generations of Indians not to be overawed by wealth or political power.

This cultural inheritance stood in sharp contrast to the regimented ideology of the RSS. While professing allegiance to ancient Indian culture, the organisation drew considerable inspiration from the fascist movements of pre-Second World War Europe. Hitler's Germany was at times cited approvingly in RSS circles.

The justification offered was that Hindus, supposedly subjected to centuries of enslavement and persecution, needed to be organised into a disciplined and militant force to protect themselves against Muslim oppression.

This thesis reflects a distorted understanding of Indian society and history. Yet it found an audience among sections of Hindus, particularly those who had experienced the trauma of Partition and displacement from Pakistan. The Bharatiya Jana Sangh, the precursor of the BJP, was established in 1951. But the larger ideological project of the RSS has remained rooted in preserving the traditional social and power structures that have historically privileged upper-caste Hindus, long before the advent of Islam or the arrival of Muslim rulers in India.

Modi may not have fully understood all the deeper impulses within the RSS, but he implemented its majoritarian and anti-minority agenda with extraordinary zeal. His corporate supporters provided financial resources, managerial expertise and access to influential media platforms. His limited appreciation of India's complex social history also prevented him from recognising the country's extraordinary cultural and social diversity.

Within the BJP and outside it, dissent was systematically suppressed through the combined use of political power, money and government machinery. A pliant bureaucracy and a compromised media helped construct a larger-than-life image of Modi. Encouraged by this personality cult, he increasingly behaved like an autocrat, apparently forgetting that even the most powerful government in a democracy operates within constitutional and institutional limits.

As the initial euphoria over the supposed restoration of Hindu rule after a thousand years began to fade, economic realities surfaced and the BJP's electoral performance showed signs of weakening. Yet Opposition parties, liberal think tanks, middle-class professionals and intellectuals largely failed to recognise the significance of these developments. Many had resigned themselves to living under what they described as a neo-fascist regime.

The sustained efforts of a handful of Opposition leaders, including Rahul Gandhi, Mamata Banerjee, Akhilesh Yadav and the ageing and ailing Lalu Prasad Yadav, were often dismissed as futile. The resistance mounted by a few journalists, intellectuals and social activists was similarly seen as having little chance of changing the political situation.

But those who had reconciled themselves to an authoritarian and regimented society were equally mistaken. Modi's rule undoubtedly curtailed dissent and made public protest increasingly difficult and risky. But it was never the final word on India's political future, regardless of the alleged manipulation of electoral processes.

India is simply too complex and diverse to be permanently controlled by a narrow, sectarian ideology. The country also has a long tradition of questioning authority and resisting oppressive rulers. Seventy-five years of democratic governance, twelve parliamentary elections and nearly 500 elections to state legislatures have further strengthened these democratic instincts and institutions.

The RSS-BJP leadership, particularly Modi and his Gujarat circle, was wrong in imagining that its near-total control over the political system could continue indefinitely. Equally mistaken were those in the Opposition and civil society who had begun to regard authoritarian rule as an irreversible reality.

The November 1 rally may not, by itself, mark a decisive turning point in Indian politics. Its larger significance lies in restoring confidence among those who believe in democracy, secularism, pluralism and constitutional values. It has reminded them that resistance is possible and that political change remains within the realm of possibility.

The idea of an inclusive, secular and liberal India is once again back on the centre stage.

(A veteran journalist and media Guru, Prof Mathur heads Mediamap news network and chairs the non-profit MBKM Foundation.}